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RECENT DECISIONS
Here the Court has for the first time explicitly and clearly
upheld the power of the Grand Jury to compel witnesses to fill out
questionnaires dealing with financial status. Of necessity, a policy
decision such as this should be limited to the facts from which it
arose, namely simple financial questionnaires. 20 Since it may be
dangerous to permit extension of this rule, the courts should be wary
of recognizing arbitrary exceptions. 2'
EQUITY - ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION CONCERNING CON-
TINUED AVAILABILITY OF CUSTOMERS HELD SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION TO IssuE.-Plaintiffs-vendees alleged fraud
on the part of the vendor on the sale of a candy store. Vendor repre-
sented the proximity of a subway station as a primary asset of the
store, but failed to disclosed current efforts of the Transit Authority
to demolish that station. Vendees also alleged that the vendor stated
during negotiations that there was no reason to believe that the bus-
iness from the subway station would not continue for the duration of
the current lease. On a motion to enjoin transfer of negotiable in-
struments and funds given as the purchase price, the Court on re-
argument, held that an injunction pendente lite be granted in view of
the allegation that the defendant uttered a misleading statement as to
extrinsic facts, affecting the value of the store, upon which purchasers
might have had a right to rely. Saslow v. Novick, 19 Misc.2d 712,
191 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
To obtain an injunction pendente lite it is incumbent upon plain-
tiff to demonstrate, among other things, a reasonable likelihood of
attaining ultimate relief upon trial of his cause.' Therefore, in the
20 In this regard the questions in such a questionnaire should be char-
acterized as "clear, simple, direct and unambiguous. They should be phrased
so that a person of average intelligence may determine exactly what informa-
tion is sought by each question, without the introduction of possible confusion
by somewhat similar or overlapping queries in other parts of the questionnaire."
People v. Workman, 308 N.Y. 668, 670, 124 N.E.2d 314, 315 (1954) (per
curiam).21 In the concurring opinion Judge Burke states: "Since the Grand
Jury has the power to investigate corruption, bribery and other crimes com-
mitted in the Department of Buildings, the grant of express statutory au-
thority to the Grand Jury imports the existence of implied powers reasonably
essential to the investigatio and uncovering of crime and corruption." A
principle as broad as this might result in undue extension of Grand Jury
power. People ex tel. Sillifant v. City of New York, 6 N.Y.2d 487, 491,
160 N.E.2d 890, 892, 190 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1959) (concurring opinion).
1 Wormser v. Brown, 149 N.Y. 163, 43 N.E. 524 (1896); Village of
Mamaroneck v. Lichtie, 72 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct 1947). "A temporary
injunction will be granted only where the movant has established a clear legal
right to such relief and where the denial of such relief would result in
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instant case, the success of the plaintiff's motion depended on the
showing of a valid cause of action in fraud.2
While fraud or deceit is a concept not aienable to precise defi-
nition, it is described as anything short of a warranty which produces
in the mind of another a false impression conducive to action.3 Few
jurisdictions are in precise accord regarding th! enumeration of ele-
ments essential to an action in deceit, yet all appear to produce sub-
stantially similar portraits of the wrong. New York is content to
enumerate only representation, falsity, scienter, deception and injury.4
To be fraudulent, the representation complained of ordinarily
must relate to some past or existing material fact as distinguished
from opinion or prediction.5 Erroneous estimates involving personal
judgment, if they be so expressed and can be interpreted reasonably
as such, offer no grounds for redress.6 Whether a representation be
one of fact or of opinion must be determined by a jury 7 weighing
the attending circumstances of each case.'
There are several important exceptions to the rule that misstate-
ments of opinion are not actionable.9 Among them, and of special
pertinence to this case,10 is the rule that opinions as to the value of
property sold cannot be misrepresentations unless they relate to ex-
irreparable and irremedial damage. A restraining order is never granted if
the ultimate relief sought by the movant is doubtful ...or where immediate
trial is possible." Id. at 687.
2 See Saslow v. Novick, 19 Misc.2d 712, 191 N.Y.S.2d 645, (Sup. Ct
1959).
3 Fernandina Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Peters, 283 Fed. 621 (S.D.
Fla. 1922).
4Karscher v. Dewald, 246 App. Div. 21, 284 N.Y. Sul. 213 (1st Dep't
1935); People v. Federated Radio Corp., 216 App. Div. 2 5, 214 N.Y. Supp.
670 (2d Dep't 1926) (per curiam), aff'd, 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926).
Compare J. I. Case Co. v. Bird, 51 Idaho 725, 11 P.2d 966 (1932), where
the court indicates nine essential elements, but where no substantive distinction
appears between fraud in Idaho and fraud in New York.
5 Holt v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co., 67 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1933);
Shields v. New York Oil Burner Co., 262 App. Div. 854 (2d Dep't 1941)
(memorandum decision).
1 Irvlor Realty Corp. v. 62-114 Imlay St. Corp., 151 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct.
1956), aff'd, 7 App. Div.2d 645, 180 N.Y.S.2d 202 (2d Dep't 1958; See Yaswen
v. Pollack, 155 Misc. 475, 280 N.Y. Supp. 512 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1934).
7 See Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N.Y. 348, 60 N.E. 663 (1901).
s Seeman Bros., Inc. v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 16 F2d 265, 266 (2d Cir.
1926) ; Bareham & McFarland, Inc. v. Kane, 228 App. Div. 396, 240 N.Y. Supp.
123 (4th Dep't 1930).
9 See Haserot v. Keller, 67 Cal. App. 659, 228 Pac. 383 (1924).
10 Saslow v. Novick, 19 Misc. 2d 712, 191 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The court granted the injunction sought by the plaintiff on the ground that
the defendant's statement that there was no reason to assume that the added
business from the subway station would not continue for the duration of the
present lease "would, if true, be the sort of misleading statement as to
extrinsic facts, affecting the value of the store, upon which the plaintiff might
have had a right to rely. . . ." Id. at 714, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
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trinsic circumstances affecting the value of such property." Opinions
designed and expressed in an effort to conceal or misstate material
facts 12 or forestall inquiry 13 may also be fraud.
The rationale for denying as actionable a fraud 14 based on pre-
dictions is that the hearer has no right to rely on the statements.15
But, again, qualifications and exceptions have arisen.16 Significant
among such exceptions is the prediction fraudulently calculated to
misstate or conceal a material fact,'7 or forestall inquiry by the
hearer.' 8
However, mere silence upon a material fact is not generally
subject to the charge .of fraud. 19 Nevertheless, the law distinguishes
between non-actionable silence and culpable concealment.20 To render
silence a concealment or active suppression, there must have been
something which produced in the defendant a duty to speak,21 whether
it was the presence of a fiduciary relationship 22 or other attendant
circumstances. 3 . . The real problem seems to arise in determining
what circumstances demand disclosure since no attempt is made to
define in any but general terms the occasions that create a duty to
speak.2 4 The obligation to communicate pertinent facts may arise in
11 Simar v. Canaday, 53 N.Y. 298 (1873). The court, commenting on
whether certain assertions made by the defendant were matters of opinion,
said "if they were such, no liability is created by the utterance of them; but
all statements as to value of property sold are not such. They may be, under
certain circumstances, affirmations of fact.... [W]here they are fraudulently
made of particulars in relation to the estate which the vendee has not equal
means of knowing, and where he is induced to forebear inquiries which he
would otherwise have made, and damage ensues, the party guilty of the fraud
will be liable for the damages sustained." Id. at 306-07. See Hubbell v. Meigs,
50 N.Y. 480. (1872).
12 See Coleman v. Night Commander Lighting Co., 218 Ala. 196, 118 So.
377 (1928); Rapochi v. Continental Ins. Co., 121 Pa. Super. 538, 184 AtI.
308 (1936).13 Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N.Y. 348, 60 N.E. 663 (1901).
14 See Eade v. Reich, 120 Cal. App. 32, 7 P.2d 1043 (1932); Moran v.
Holmes Mfg. Co., 99 Conn. 180, 121 Atl. 346 (1923).
1 Farmers Union Co-op. Royalty Co. v. Southward, 183 Okla. 402, 82 P.2d
819 (1938).16 See Lloyd v. Smith, 150 Va. 132, 142 S.E. 363 (1928).
17 Russ Lumber & Mill Co. v. Muscupiabe Land & Water Co., 120 Cal. 521,
52 Pac. 995 (1898).
'is See Collinson v. Jeffries, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 653, 54 S.W. 28 (1899).
10 Amend v. Hurley, 293 N.Y. 587, 59 N.E.2d 416 (1944).
20 Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888).
21 Magee v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 93 (1875) (dictum).
22 Hcsv. Wallace, 190 Ky. 287, 227 S.W. 293 (1921).
23 Racine Fuel Co. v. Rawlins, 377 Ill. 375, 36 N.E.2d 710 (1941). See
generally RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 550-52 (1938).
24 See Hadley v. Clinton County Importing Co., 13 Ohio St. 502, 82 Am.
Dec. 454 (1862). See also Fecheimer v. Baum, 37 Fed. 167 (1889). It is well
recognized that whether a duty to speak exists is determined by all the circum-
stances of the case. Id. at 177.
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many ways; among them, and particularly noteworthy in considering
the main case, is the situation wherein a party says or does something
which for want of further explanation is false and deceptive.25
Manifestly, the number of forms and varieties under which a
deception may be perpetrated is as limitless as the imagination and
cunning of mankind. It is well, therefore, that definitions be broad
and flexible lest a type of fraud not within the purview of the defini-
tion be devised. Thus, no rule can be thought absolute. Neverthe-
less, categories, or theories, of deceit have evolved. The difficulty
arises when given circumstances which are not readily applied to the
categories or rules are encountered. In many areas the courts are
apparently guided by conscience, but with an eye to precedent, policy
and whatever other elements they deem pertinent.
26
The instant case, as is later indicated, may reasonably be placed
under several categories of fraud. This presents a problem difficult
enough. But in addition, there is present in this seemingly fraudu-
lent transaction the sometimes excusing circumstances that the al-
leged concealment was of a fact on public record, that the parties
dealt at arms length (a fact which generally excuses non-disclosure),
and that the final decision of the Transit Authority had not been,
nor in the future could be, influenced in any way by either party.
Finally, research reveals no compelling precedent with regard to the
degree of bad faith indicated under the Saslow facts. The decision
in this case indicates an extension of the existing area of actionable
fraud in the categories of non-disclosure and false statements as to
extrinsic facts.
The present decision was rendered in part upon the authority
of Greenberg v. Glickman 2T and Schroeder v. Schroeder.28  Both
these cases were cited in support of the proposition that defendant
Novick was under a duty to disclose the fact that the Transit
Authority was making an attempt to dismantle the subway station
adjacent to the candy store in question. Yet, while the words used
in these cases at first blush seem to apply to the present case, 29 the
25 Burton v. Maupin, 281 S.W. 83, 90 (Mo. 1926); Hadley v. Clinton
County Importing Co., note 24 .supra.
26 For a detailed treatment of the "shadow areas" of fraud, including
fraudulent concealment, see Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-
Purchaser Relation, 8 W. RIs. L. REv. 5 (1956).
2750 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct.), modified mem., 268 App. Div. 882, 51
N.Y.S.2d 96 (2d Dep't 1944).
28269 App. Div. 405, 56 N.Y.S.2d 36 (4th Dep't 1945) (per curiam).
29 Schroeder v. Schroeder, 269 App. Div. 405, 56 N.Y.S.2d 36 (4th Dep't
1945) (per curiam). "[W]hen one of the parties, pending negotiations for a
contract, has held out to the other the existence of a certain set of facts ma-
terial to the subject of the contract, and knows that the other party is acting
upon the inducement of their existence, and while they are pending knows
that a change has occurred of which the other party is ignorant, good faith
and common honesty require him to correct the misapprehension which he has
created." Id. at 408, 56 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
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circumstances that inspired them involve a form of fraud distinctly
more severe than is here presented.
In Schroeder, the plaintiff agreed to accept, as part of a sep-
aration agreement, an insurance policy represented by the defendant
to be of a certain value. After the negotiations, but before final
settlement, the defendant withdrew the dividends from the policy,
and in so doing caused a substantial reduction in its value. The
court maintained that the defendant's failure to disclose the fact of
the withdrawal of the dividends could be fraudulent concealment.
A comparison between the Schroeder and Saslow cases discloses
no fair analogy. At least two major distinctions appear. First, the
defendant in Schroeder allegedly had committed positive, physical
acts to effect the injury. The non-disclosure therefore constituted
a mere portion of his fraudulent scheme. However, in the present
case the gravamen of the complaint is non-disclosure under circum-
stances not brought about by the defendant. Secondly, the fact with-
held in the present case, unlike that in Schroeder, was a matter of
public record and conceded to be so by both parties. It is univer-
sally recognized that silence, however damaging, is excused in some
.cases where the information withheld is a matter discoverable through
ordinary diligence.30
The Greenberg case may similarly be distinguished upon the
facts. There the seller of a dwelling house, in response to buyer's
question, falsely stated actual facts which were peculiarly within his
knowledge as builder of the premises, viz., the reason for dampness
in the basement. The court held that defendant's non-disclosure of
the fact that the cellar was often flooded was fraudulent. It is diffi-
cult to understand how that decision can be considered as authority in
the principal case where the defendant's silence was accompanied only
by a statement which was at best mere opinion or prediction.31
Considerable reliance is also placed upon Ellis v. Andrews
32
and Chrysler v. Canaday 33 as authority for attaching liability for
fraud upon the misrepresentation of extrinsic elements affecting the
value of property sold. In Ellis, the court discussed the rule with
-approval but failed to apply it. There the court dismissed the claim
before it, commenting in effect, that if the facts alleged had described
a situation where false statements as to extrinsic factors affecting
value appeared, the action might have been sustained.34 The court
,cited Hubbell v. Meigs 3 5 as an example of the rule pertaining to ex-
trinsic facts affecting value. In that case, the defendant's statements,
30 See Schumaker v. Mather, 133 N.Y. 590, 30 N.E. 755 (1892).
31 Saslow v. Novick, 19 Misc.2d 712, 713, 191 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
3256 N.Y. 83 (1874).
3390 N.Y. 272 (1882).
34 Ellis v. Andrews, s=pra, note 32, at 87.
-3550 N.Y. 480 (1872).
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made with the intent to induce the purchase of worthless railroad
stock, were held sufficient to constitute grounds for fraud. But a
consideration of his statements demonstrates that he lied about his
relation to the issuing company, about a bogus land grant to the
company, about the amount of stock then outstanding and the amount
yet to be issued, about the length of time the stock was to be offered,
about the progress of the railroad's construction, about the earnings
the stock would yield, about the time at which dividends would be
paid, about the company's management team and about myriad other
items. The defendant was evidently a swindler in earnest. If this
case be of the variety of fraud contemplated by the Ellis court, can
the Ellis decision be fairly employed against defendant Novick in
the principal case?
In Chrysler, the court's own words serve to distinguish it as
involving a far more notorious fraud than could be imagined under
the facts of the principal case.
3 6
'
Considered in- toto then, it would appear that the grant of the
injunction in the principal case rests upon authority somewhat less
than compelling and upon a theory of fraud none too firm. Perhaps
the action would proceed more logically upon allegations that the
defendant's statement concerning the business from the subway sta-
tion was a fraudulent misstatement of his state of mind,3 7 or that it
constituted a partial disclosure, misleading unless completed,38 or a
non-disclosure coupled with artifice to prevent investigation by plain-
tiff,39 or an utterance in the guise of opinion designed to misstate or
6 Chrysler v. Canaday, 90 N.Y. 272 (1882). Describing the facts pre-
sented, the court declared: "In this case there are facts proven which show
artifice and conspiracy from the outset on the part of the defendant to cheat
and defraud the plaintiff, who was put in communication with parties who
aided in carrying out the deception and putting him under the influence of
confederates who acted in collusion and with the palpable purpose to deceive
and defraud him. Id. at 279.
s7 Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 65 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1933) ; Philadelphia
Storage Battery Co. v. Kelley-Iow-Thompson Co., 64 F.2d 834 (8th Cir.
1933) ; Blakeslee v. Wallace, 45 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1930); Commercial Trust
Co. v. Burch, 267 Fed. 907 (S.D. Ga. 1920); Bareham & McFarland v. Kane,
228 App. Div. 396, 240 N.Y. Supp. 123 (4th Dep't 1930); Pease & Elliman,
Inc. v. Wegeman, 223 App. Div. 682, 229 N.Y. Supp. 398 (1st Dep't 1928).
See also Fahnestock v. Clark Henry Corp., 151 Misc. 593, 272 N.Y. Supp. 49(Sup. Ct. 1934); Jeleniewski v. Eck, 175 Wis. 497, 185 N.W. 540 (1921).
"There is much authority for the view that a condition of mind is as much
a fact as a condition of the body, although more difficult to prove, and that
therefore a misstatement of a man's mind is a misstatement of fact." Id. at -,
185 N.W. at 541.
38 See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Ralsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941);
American Bonding Co. v. Fourth Natl Bank, 206 Ala. 639, 91 So. 480 (1921);
Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio St. 484, 93 Am. Dec. 638 (1867); RESTATzmENT,
TORTS § 529, comment a (1938).
39 Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888); Atwood
v. Chapman, 68 Me. 38, 28 Am. Rep. 5 (1872). See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
§ 550, comment a (1938).
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conceal a material fact 40 or was a prediction calculated to misstate
fact or forestall inquiry.41 For the Court to sustain the action on
the theories advanced would constitute an unnecessary extension of
an already vague area of the law.
M
REAL PROPERTY - UNAUTHORIZED LEGAL PRACTiCE - LEGAL
ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH TITLE CLOSING BY TITLE INSUR-
ANCE Co. HELD NOT UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw.-Defendant,
a title insurance company, employed both staff and independent
lawyers to draft deeds and trust deeds and to execute instruments
necessary for correction of defects in title (although this is primarily
the business of the customer, not the company), with the giving of
legal advice incidental thereto. It was the contention of plaintiff that
all these activities constituted the unauthorized practice of law and
should be enjoined. The lower court sustained plaintiff's argument
and issued an injunction. The Court of Appeals, while agreeing that
defendant's activities constituted a practice of law, held, by a divided
Court, that they were "all legitimately incidental to the main or
principle [sic] business" of defendant, and consequently did not con-
stitute the illegal practice of law. Bar Ass'n of Tenn., Inc. v. Union
Planters Title Guar. Co., - Tenn. App. -, 326 S.W.2d 767, cert.
denied, - Tenn. App. - (1959).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely define the practice
of law.1 Obviously it is not limited to practice before a court of
justice, but includes legal advice, and the preparation of legal in-
struments, whether or not such matters are pending before a court.2
Nor are merely incompetent individuals excluded from such practice,
but the exclusion extends to lay persons or organizations who prac-
tice indirectly through competent lawyers.3
Since every state, in one form or another, has enacted legisla-
40Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N.Y. 348, 60 N.E. 663 (1901);
Olston v. Oregon Water Power & Ry. Co., 52 Ore. 343, 96 Pac. 1095 (1908).41 Von Schrader v. Milton, 96 Cal. App. 192, 273 Pac. 1074 (1929);
RESTAEENT, TORTS § 539 (1938).
1 Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 190 Atl 2, 9 (1937);
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 5? RI. 122, 179 Atl. 139,
140 (1935).
2 Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836, 837-38 (1893); In re
Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909).
3 E.g., In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 484, 92 N.E. 15, 16
(1910) (dictum); Wayne v. Murphey-Favre & Co., 56 Idaho 788, 59 P.Zd 721,
723 (1936). See also canons 6, 35, and 47 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics (dealing with the duties of lawyers towards conflicting interests, inter-
mediaries in the practice of law, and unauthorized practice).
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